

Lampedusa-Europe a common way

THE SEMINARS

2



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Wilfried
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This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and the De Gasperi Foundation. This publication receives funding from the European Parliament.

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The processing of the publication was concluded in 2014.



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© 2014 Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati SpA
via Comelico 3 – 20135 Milano
<http://www.guerini.it>
e-mail: info@guerini.it

Prima edizione digitale: dicembre 2014

Copertina di Giovanna Gammarota

Foto di copertina: © LoloStock - Fotolia.com

ISBN 978-88-8195-069-0

LAMPEDUSA-EUROPE: A COMMON WAY

*Tuesday, 2 December 2014
Chamber of Commerce of Rome*

Fondazione De Gasperi
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies

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*Speeches by Codini, Blangiardo, Alfano, Bertin, Abouyoub, Jolles and Introduction
 by Malagola were given in Italian and then translated in English.
 Speeches by Kaczmarczyk, Pascouau, Shaker and Dzurinda were given in English.*

Introduction

*Lorenzo Malagola
Secretary General,
De Gasperi Foundation*

This book is a collection of the speeches given at the international seminar *Lampedusa-Europe: a common way* held in Rome on December 2nd 2014 and organized by the De Gasperi Foundation and the Martens Centre for European Studies in Brussels. The speeches were given in two sessions: the first in the presence of distinguished scholars and researchers in the field of immigration studies, the second hosting representatives from institutions and organizations in Europe and north Africa.

The purpose of my introduction is simply to explain the reason why we decided to organize this convention: 2014 has seen 160,000 landings in Italy from Africa, compared with 43,000 in 2013. This represents a quadrupling in the number of arrivals from the African continent in Italy, and therefore in Europe. This statistic provides a concrete number for the emergency which we find ourselves facing, an emergency which I have no hesitation in describing as historic and which has to be faced using extraordinary means and tools, above all from the political and institutional point of view.

Lampedusa today is the entry point for Europe; it is not only the border of Italy but also the southernmost frontier for the whole of Europe. It is, thus, only from a community perspective that we can engage with the emergency of this enormous

flow of men and women out of Africa trying to reach Europe and the standard of living that Europe represents.

We want, therefore, to examine the causes of this phenomenon; we want to find out what Italy is doing by way of reception, and we want to look into those issues which are still unresolved for Europe in the face of this extraordinary challenge from a cultural, economic and political perspective.

I believe that this will be one of the great issues which will shape the politics of future decades: together with the financial-economic crisis, the subject of immigration is one of the great questions that will engage our politics and institutions over the coming years.

Part I

*Origins and Characteristics
of the Migrations
in the Mediterranean Area*

Chapter I

Ennio Codini
Professor of Principles of Public Law,
Catholic University of Milan

In drawing up these brief notes for the convention, I began by assuming that, all things considered, the various countries in some way involved in this phenomenon, whether we consider them «European nations» or «non-European nations», have the same interests at heart.

The primary objective is surely that of reducing the number of people who are forced to flee from their own country. On this subject there isn't much to say: the response can only be to create even more solid democratic institutions in the various African and Middle-Eastern countries from which the refugees are coming.

The second objective is to ensure that, as far as possible, those who are nevertheless obliged to flee should find asylum in lands which are closer to them, so that they no longer have to travel as they do today from Somalia all the way to Italy because there is a sort of no-man's-land in between where nobody can find shelter. In this case too, the key word is clearly *democracy*: if civilized living conditions could be achieved, even in just those north African countries which look onto the Mediterranean, there would be a change in the whole scenario that we are facing, with regard to these flows of people looking towards Europe for protection.

The third requirement is that, in any event, those who find themselves travelling to Europe should do so under decent conditions and then be offered a decent reception. With regard to this objective (the one most frequently discussed) we all know that there is no single measure capable of guaranteeing it: a complex strategy has to be developed and applied (it has, in part, been done and in part it remains to be done). Above all there is a need to ensure that there are places of safety near crisis points: we can see how the provision of shelter in Lebanon for Syrian refugees in recent years has reduced the pressure from Syria on Europe precisely because it offers a safe haven near the point of crisis. Nevertheless it is easy to foresee that we will have many, many people heading to the European Union over the coming months and years. It is essential, therefore, that measures are put into effect primarily to avoid travelling under the present conditions, measures to by-pass the itinerary which leads to Lampedusa (and we know under what conditions people arrive in Lampedusa).

To this end I personally believe that it is time we move from theory to action with regard to protected and guaranteed entry procedures. For years there has been talk among various European countries, at the European Union level, about the possibility of introducing procedures for protected entry, so that people would no longer have to depend on this or that organization to cross Africa. Instead they could apply to a specially dedicated office to seek asylum and, if their request is considered to have some foundation, obtain a visa to enter Europe legally. Procedures of this kind are almost non-existent at present: we have studies, but we don't have procedures in operation.

I believe, however, that in the face of the tragedies which are taking place in the Mediterranean every day, it is a moral obligation to try out procedures of this kind. There will still be tragedies; we cannot imagine that such procedures will provide an immediate solution to such enormous flows of people across the Mediterranean, but at least we will be able

to say that we did what we could, and that we tried to offer an alternative solution.

Having said that, there will continue to be arrivals by sea or, in any event, by channels which give rise to dramatic experiences. What are the most problematic issues with regard to these arrivals? In the first place there is the question of rescue at sea, which has been much discussed and therefore doesn't need to be explained here, except to remember that the duty of maritime rescue is one of our most ancient laws and that our actions must therefore be a consequence of this.

A second point which has led to much debate, particularly in Europe, concerns the shortcomings of the initial reception, an extremely delicate issue: both Greece and Italy have found themselves under criticism around Europe in recent months (or we can now even say recent years) for not ensuring conditions of dignity and respect for fundamental human rights to those who arrive. This is a highly sensitive subject.

Another delicate issue is one that can be referred to as «imbalance»: there are imbalances among European nations with regard to sharing the responsibility of dealing with these influxes. Expressed in very simple terms, we know that Italy is, so to speak, «specialised» in initial reception and has a rather heavy burden from this point of view; Germany and Sweden are «specialised» in successive reception and the handling of asylum requests, but with a structure that neither of them considers satisfactory. It may seem paradoxical but both Italy and Germany, as well as Sweden and other countries, say: «too much of the burden falls on us». This is the current European perception: too much is asked of us, the others do too little. This refrain is heard in Rome and in Berlin, just as it is in Stockholm and other capitals. So it is clear that something is not right in the way the burdens of reception are distributed in Europe.

What can be done about the shortcomings of initial reception and the imbalances that have developed over successive reception, in general, and the handling of international

asylum procedures? A primary need, one which is not commonly focussed upon and which I would therefore like to emphasize here, is to predict future flows. The phenomenon is still viewed, to an excessive extent, in terms of being an emergency, as if every month we have to look out to sea and ask: «How many people are coming?» The situation is not really like that; as with other global phenomena, it is possible to carry out studies and make predictions. Today perhaps only Sweden has an adequate service – significantly, they call it *intelligence*, in English, because it is a matter of acquiring information on a global scale – able to interpret certain phenomena and to take action in advance. This is, in my opinion, fundamental. On the whole the European Union and individual European nations do not have adequate intelligence services enabling them to foresee flows and this is a factor which gives rise to difficulties. At times this results in emergencies which might otherwise not be considered as such.

A second need is, of course, to reduce the imbalances among the various European Union countries which find themselves taking in refugees. How can this be done? Among the many possible strategies I would like to indicate some which, in my view, could be important for diminishing these imbalances.

The first strategy is to make standards of reception more similar. There is an EU directive which imposes minimum standards for reception on the part of all the various countries but what we see in reality is that standards are extremely variable. The reception guaranteed in Germany is very different from that in Italy and these differences, which are still highly significant, have an effect on the direction of the inflow since, logically, flows orientate themselves as far as possible towards places where the reception is perceived by those concerned as being more suitable for their needs. I will give a very simple example: an official involved in the Swedish intelligence service told me that one of the factors which they consider most useful in predicting whether flows will orient more towards Germany or towards Sweden (it is important for them to know six months

or a year in advance how many will go to Germany and how many to Sweden) is the total financial contribution given as an alternative to assistance within special reception centres. These financial benefits decided from time to time by the authorities in Germany and Sweden – obviously with different figures between the two countries – consequently influence to some extent the flow of incomers. The first strategy is, therefore, to make more similar standards of reception as far as possible.

Another important step is to make procedures more uniform and the criteria for evaluating requests more similar. Today in Europe, if we compare figures on asylum requests granted by various countries, we still find enormous differences which depend, in part, on where the incomers are from (not all countries have incomers with the same origins and therefore the same conditions). Thus these differences in the proportion of requests granted are the result, in part, of the different countries of origin of asylum seekers. Nevertheless there seems to be no doubt that different criteria are being used in applying the principles which theoretically are common to all. These countries all apply the same rules to establish the legitimacy of requests and yet the application is not uniform. This is clearly an element of imbalance.

In this regard I would like to suggest that encouraging an exchange of officials among the different authorities in the various States would probably lead to the development of a common culture. Having a French official in our commissions and an Italian official in those of Belgium might ensure greater uniformity over the medium term and avoid the impression that some countries are «easy» while others are «difficult», since this is also a factor causing imbalance in flows.

The question of economic resources also plays a part. It is a statement of the obvious that, if the costs of reception were to a large extent the responsibility of Europe, many of the disputes and many of the imbalances in the distribution of asylum seekers, which we experience in Europe today, would be eliminated.

Finally, there is the important issue of ensuring a certain degree of mobility in Europe for those who seek and then obtain asylum. Today this mobility is severely restricted but I believe that it must be encouraged. What, in practice, would greater mobility mean? It would allow those who have entered the European asylum system to reach the place where they really want to go, which is often the place where they have a greater chance of integration. The reality is that people who come to Europe and find themselves in one country while wishing to move to another are not doing this out of a whim. They do it as a result, for example, of family networks, community networks, knowledge of a certain language or possession of a background which makes it easier for them to fit into a certain context. Therefore encouraging the movement of people around Europe would also be in the interests of the States, allowing people to find, as far as possible, circumstances where they have greater opportunity.

What is certain is that to accomplish all this will require, among many other things, one important element which today is missing in Europe and which is much more significant than the definition of this or that rule or the achievement of this or that policy. It seems that what Europe lacks today, above all, is confidence among States, because rules and commitments are not respected. Thus, together with reform along the lines which I have taken the liberty of suggesting here today – obviously in very brief form only – there must also be respect for rules and, in general, respect for commitments because, without mutual trust, any plan that some expert or some committee of experts may come up with, whatever it is, will not even be approved.

Chapter II


*Gian Carlo Blangiardo
Professor of Demography,
University Milano-Bicocca*

The title of my presentation *Not Only Lampedusa, Beyond Lampedusa* is an attempt to underline the fact that immigration and the presence of foreigners in Italy is not limited to the drama of the emergency in Lampedusa. Immigrants in Italy (and obviously not only in Italy) are part of a much wider phenomenon which we would do well to examine and attempt to understand in all its various aspects – quantitative and qualitative dimensions and problematic issues – and to make the correct and necessary evaluations.

1. Migration in Europe

Immigration in Europe is a widespread and important phenomenon. In Figure 1 we consider net migration: it can be seen, peaks of over a million people, even over a million and a half, have been reached. Then came the crisis, a sudden drop and a reduced level more recently. If we take the decade 2001-2011, for example, and consider for each of the various countries simply the net contribution, in other words the increase in population as a result of net migratory flows, we see that Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom are at the top of the table, with the largest number of additional people per year (in the Figure 2, *Average net contribution*).

Figure 1. EU28 Net migration 1991-2012 (plus statistical adjustment)



Source: EUROSTAT demo_gind 26.9.14

Figure 2. Average net contribution (thousands of people added/lost annually) in the 28 EU countries. Years 2001-2011. By comparing resident populations at the beginning and the end of different time intervals (according to the survival rates of the corresponding period) the contribution of migration to the EU28 population as a whole was equal, *from 2001 to 2011, to nearly 14 million: annually 1,373 thousand additional people on average*





Figure 3. Asylum applicants and people arrived in Italy by sea. Years 2008-2013




Source: EUROSTAT (extracted on 1st September 2014) and ISMU

In the European Union as a whole, over the course of the decade, there are an additional 14 million people who are there but would not have been if it had not been for immigration. We know that there are countries of traditional immigration and countries of new immigration all of which have particular characteristics. Countries of new immigration such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Finland, have certain features which differentiate them to some extent from countries where there is a tradition of immigration.

2. Presence of foreigners in Italy

Among the countries of new immigration, Italy is a particularly important case and not only because of the numbers involved. Lampedusa is certainly an important aspect of the phenomenon

Figure 4. Foreigners in Italy. Years 1961-2013




(and this is why we are talking about it here) but, as I have already mentioned, it is only one aspect and perhaps, all things considered, not the most significant in quantitative terms.

In this convention the issue of asylum seekers and the large increase in the number of landings in Italy (160,000 up to November 2014) have already been referred to. This is a phenomenon of great significance and without any precedent.

However, looking beyond this particular aspect, there is the issue of immigration in the wider sense. One way of giving a concrete idea of the extent of immigration is to point out that the presence of foreigners in Italy is equivalent to a twenty-first region of the dimensions of Campania, Veneto or Sicily. We are talking about over 5 million people: a phenomenon which has grown extremely rapidly and has undergone certain important transformations over the course of time. It is no longer the migration of the early years, in the 1970s, and from many points of view it has become something quite different. The growth trend has been exponential, as it is obvious from Figure 5 and needs almost no further comment. It can be seen

Figure 5. Residents in Italy at Censuses 1981-2011 by citizenship (thousands)




that the resident population in Italy has increased over the last thirty years but only thanks to immigration. In Figure 5 the continuous black line represents native Italian residents – who have fallen from 56 and a half million to 55 and a half million – whereas the red line represents foreign residents in Italy. As can be clearly seen, this component is the one responsible for overall growth in population.

The data also show us how immigration has changed from the point of view of age structure.

Figure 6 compares the characteristics of 2011 with those of 1991. We see that in 2011 there is a higher level on the left of the graph (age groups 0-4 and 5-9, i.e. children, second generation) and also a shift towards the right with regard to the presence of older, more mature people. Thus there is a pattern of immigration combining a greater presence of the very young with an adult population which is increasingly less young.

Figure 6. Distribution by age of foreign residents. Censuses 1991-2011



Countries of origin have changed. Initially Moroccans were more predominant but today there are more Romanians (who are EU citizens but who can nevertheless be considered as part of a migratory movement) and Albanians. Other changes in the composition of migratory flows include the presence of migrants from the Indian sub-continent (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan) who are not extremely numerous but whose numbers will certainly grow over time.

Numbers of immigrant families have risen, a development from the classic pattern of immigration of workers to one of immigration with a more family-centred character. It is not simply a question of there being more children, minors, second generation. It is becoming clear that there is a migratory project which is radically different from the past. People now coming to settle in the country have lifetime ambitions which easily adapt to making the choice of migration a definitive one, even though they may not initially have planned it that way. When people have their family here and their children go to school here, with all that means in terms of friendships and bonds, they may still dream of returning rich and famous to their country of origin but, in fact, while they may often come

Figure 7. Resident foreigners in Italy at censuses 1991-2011 (% of Main Countries)






Figure 8. Families with at least one resident foreigner at Censuses 1991-2011 (thousands)



and go on visits to their homeland, they stay here because their future is being built here.

Figure 9. Foreign population irregularly present in Italy. Years 1990-2013 (thousands)




Source: ISMU estimates of different years

3. From temporary status and illegality to long term stability and access to citizenship

There is another aspect which it is worth reflecting on: we have moved progressively from a situation in which many people were here with only temporary status or even illegally (the notorious *clandestini*, once a taboo word which eventually came into common usage) to a context in which immigrants have long-term residence permits and now often Italian citizenship.

Figure 9 shows the snaking curves of illegal immigration, with numbers indicated in thousands. Since the 1990s various amnesties have resulted in falls in the number of illegals: from the early Martelli amnesty, followed by amnesties from Dini, Turco-Napolitano, Bossi-Fini and then the one by the Minister Ferrero, which was not an amnesty as such but a decree which still had the effect of «including everyone». Then there was a special measure for caregivers. It is obvious that all these

Figure 10. Share of non EU citizens regularized in 2003 still with a valid permit in Italy at 1st January 2014




ups and downs simply have the effect of an invitation to come. People arrive, then an amnesty is given and the tank is emptied, but after a while others come and so there is talk of another amnesty and so the game goes on.

The estimate of the ISMU foundation is that today there are three hundred thousand illegal immigrants. Now three hundred thousand irregulars out of at least five million people is only to be expected, so while I wouldn't say the problem has been resolved, it is certainly under control.

Figure 10, based on data from ISTAT, shows that most of the people who were regularized in 2003 are still in Italy and have a valid permit.

Access to citizenship is another subject which should not be undervalued. There have been frequent complaints that the law on citizenship does not work. In 2013 100,000 people were given citizenship in Italy. Figure 11 shows the trend over the past and predictions for the future. With the passage of

Figure 11. Annual number of accesses to Italian citizenship observed in 2002-2013 and estimated in 2014-2030 assuming no changes in the law (thousands)



time the number of people who will have accumulated the ten years of residence required by the law will grow enormously. So, while it is true that numbers today are still low (and they were even lower in the past, simply because ten years ago the number of residents was more limited), we estimate that within the next ten to twenty years something like two million five hundred thousand people will become Italian citizens.

4. Advantages and disadvantages of immigration into Italy

We can try to draw up a balance sheet. On the subject of immigration opinions diverge drastically: there are those who view it positively and others who primarily see problems. Here we would like to consider the pros and cons that emerge from the statistical data.

Let us begin by looking at the demographic aspects. It is indisputable that, from the demographic point of view, immi-

Figure 12. Natural balance 2002-2011 (thousands)

	Births	Deaths	Natural balance
Total	5,578	5,743	-165
Italians	4,981	5,705	-724
Foreigners	597	38	+559


Sources: ISTAT

gration rejuvenates or at least compensates for demographic shortcomings within the Italian population.

As it can be seen from the data shown in Figure 12, the natural balance (births-deaths) is strongly negative. Taking into account only Italians, it would have been negative over the decade 2002-2011 by a figure of 700,000 (excess of deaths over births). In fact the negative figure was only 165,000 because of the highly positive contribution from the foreign component. While this did not invert the trend, it mitigated it and this is an important signal. The number of children that foreign immigrants have is higher than the figure for Italians. However a note of caution is needed here: this is not a solution to our demographic problem. It would be foolish to delude ourselves that the problem of empty cradles is going to be resolved by foreigners. The total fertility rate among foreign couples of 2.6 children per woman in 2008 has already fallen to 2.3 and, in the big cities, it is to a large extent below 2. So foreign couples are encountering the same difficulties as Italian couples, indeed sometimes even more. Cultural and traditional factors still help to keep the number of children relatively high (especially when families are reunited) but as a future prospect it would be a mistake to think that the lack of births in Italy can be resolved by foreigners.


We now come to question of the labour market, as shown in Figure 14. It is obvious that immigration has provided a major contribution to the population of working age (seen primarily

Figure 13. Italy: Total fertility rate (TFR) among foreign women, 2008-2012




Source: ISTAT, *Indicatori demografici 2013*

Figure 14. Comparison between the observed Italian population in working age (15 to 64 years old) and corresponding population in absence of migration. Years 2001 and 2011 (thousands)



Source: ISMU processing on the basis of ISTAT data

Figure 15. Italy: pyramid of the age of the average annual net migrations (254,000 units per year, 2002-2011)



in the shape of the two curves in grey and black). The lower curve represents the age distribution of the working-age population if there had been no immigration, the upper curve taking into account immigration. There has therefore been a strong additional component in the supply to the Italian labour market and this has compensated for a lack which would otherwise have appeared, including for demographic reasons.

Figure 15 represents what can be described as the age pyramid of the additional population. As can be seen, the mid-life age groups (the most productive) are those which have made the largest contribution.

At this point we need to reflect on something which may not immediately come to mind but is no less important for that.

It has been observed that every year about 250,000 people on average have been added (therefore 250,000 people have immigrated on average) and a question arises over what contribution has been given to the Italian population by this addition.

Well, the contribution can be assessed simply by counting the heads (250,000) or by calculating what their presence means in terms of the future population. Let me explain: the additional people may be 20 years old, or 30, 40 or 50, and, assuming that they remain in Italy permanently, they will live here for a certain number of years depending on their age. If we work out what 250,000 annual arrivals mean in terms of the future years that this population will live, or could live, in Italy, the answer comes to 14 million. In other words we have acquired population every year which will make a contribution to Italy of 14 million «life-years».

This number, however, can be further broken down into the years lived in different phases of life: a phase of learning, a phase of working and a phase of retirement. The 14 million then becomes roughly half a million years in the education phase, 9 million in working age and 5 million in pension age. Thus, while it is true that there is a strong contribution from immigrants, also in the future, with regard to work, there will also be a part of their lives in which, if they stay here, they will be dependent on welfare.

This consideration, therefore, leads us on to the subject of welfare. In drawing up a balance between immigration pros and cons, it is an aspect which must be taken into account if we are to analyse the situation in a down-to-earth manner, putting aside any illusions that we may have.

So, how can we measure the effect on welfare among the population? One method is to use a statistical indicator which divides the number of those who are over the age of 65 (in other words the elderly) by the number of those in working age (from 20 to 64 years).

If we use this indicator, based on the population in Italy according to the 2011 census and distinguishing between foreigners and Italians, we find that for Italians the relationship is 37% (i.e. 37 dependent people for every 100 that they depend on). Making the same calculation for foreigners (almost 5 million people) the result is just over 3 per 100 (Figure 16). This might lead us to conclude that we have discovered the solution to the problems of welfare: «we have found the people who are going to pay for our

Figure 16. The dependency rate of elderly [I_{de} = % population 65 and over/ population 20-64 years old]: a parameter for monitoring the age related spending for a society. Here it is calculated at 2011 Census for Italian citizens and for foreign residents

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ita } I_{de} &= 100 * P_{65+} / P_{20-64} = \mathbf{37.3} \\ \text{frg } I_{de} &= 100 * P_{65+} / P_{20-64} = \mathbf{3.2} \end{aligned}$$

Figure 17. Dependency rates of the elderly for Italians and foreigners considering (at 2011 census) not the age at the moment but *the future expected years that will be spent* in working age and the corresponding expected years over the 65^o birthday

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ita } I_{de} &= 100 * P_{65+} / P_{20-64} = \mathbf{84.5} \\ \text{frg } I_{de} &= 100 * P_{65+} / P_{20-64} = \mathbf{61.9} \end{aligned}$$


pensions and health services». We are the ones who are going to be dependent and the others will represent the denominator in this relationship, the productive component.

However, this is just a snapshot of the situation today, based on the 2011 census. Let us examine the same data from a more long-term perspective, as we did before, thinking in more dynamic terms. We can calculate the future years which those people from the 2011 census, both Italians and foreigners, will live in working age and in pension age and we can then compare the two groups. The difference is no longer 3 compared to 37, but is now 61 compared to 84 (Figure 17). There is still a modest advantage on the side of foreigners but the significant difference has almost disappeared.

To put it briefly, at this moment things are going well but, if immigrants stay on a permanent basis (and, as previously mentioned, they tend to do so), in the end they too will form part of the population dependent on welfare.

Looked at from a positive perspective (the glass half full), immigration gives welfare a shot in the arm. It averts the problem temporarily but it does not solve it. While it enables us to gain a little time we know that it serves only to gain time.

Figure 18. Additive (or reductive) share of people who, as a consequence of past migrations, will become (or will not become) over 65 years in a selected set of countries/regions



Source: ISMU processing on the basis of UN data

Italy, along with all other countries of immigration, can be described as an importer of immigration. The phenomenon of imported immigration means that we have people, and they will become ever more numerous, who will reach the phase of old age here among us without being born here because they arrived either as adults, already mature, or as children. This particular category will be numerically insignificant over the next five years but with the passage of time it could easily reach 10-15% (represented by the broken black line in Figure 18). In short, almost 200,000 people who will reach pension age in Italy will be people born outside Italy and this in itself is not a problem. The real problem is that these are probably people who became regular workers late in life, who began to pay social security contributions late and who are entitled to only a modest pension. This will become a serious problem in 2030-2035, although we are already aware of it today.

5. Looking to the future


In conclusion, I would like to turn our attention towards the future. As Professor Codini has said, intelligence should help us to understand trends both in the flow of refugees as well as more complex phenomena such as immigration in general. And, in fact, forecasts and estimates have been made about future immigration.

At the ISMU foundation, we have made a very simple forecast, limited to considering possible surpluses in the labour market in various countries around the world. It is assumed that people enter the labour market when they reach the age to go out to work and others leave, mainly because they have gone past working age. In all countries there is a flow of generations entering and leaving. Thus, taking into account this data and employment rates, we find that there are a certain number of countries around the world which will have a surplus over the coming decades, in other words more people looking for work than those who are leaving it. It is therefore reasonable to imagine that some of this surplus could be somehow redistributed elsewhere, in other countries, such as those in Europe. In this way, using a model which is not even particularly complicated, we have the possibility of assessing the dimensions of these flows.

With regard to the EU of 28 nations, Figure 19 shows the additional numbers of a demographic-occupational nature in countries of immigration over the coming decades. Every year Europe should absorb something in the region of one million additional people. Behind these overall figures lie different preferences for different countries: Indians go to the United Kingdom, Russians to Estonia and so on.


What is interesting is that, in that flow of total migration referred to above, Africa is destined to play a fundamental role. This is not as a result of Africans escaping from something or trying to flee from a crisis, a famine or an epidemic. Here we are simply looking at «normal» conditions: what would happen in a simple situation of labour market surplus – and in fact this

Figure 19. EU28 Annual migration inflows



Sources: EUROSTAT & ISMU, *King project*

Figure 20. Annual migration inflows from Africa to EU28: 2014-2030 demo-economic forecast. Hypothesis A (and B) = without extrapolating (or extrapolating) the dynamics of the differences in GDP of the countries of origin v EU28



Source: Elaboration by ISMU of data from UN/WB/ILO

Figure 21. Annual migration inflows from Africa to Italy: 2014-2030 (hp. B)

2014 - 15	2016 - 20	2021 - 25	2026 - 30	
Africa	50.6	49.2	47.0	49.9
Morocco	20.1	17.6	14.2	14.6
Senegal	6.1	6.9	7.7	8.6
Egypt	4.9	4.7	4.6	4.7
Tunisia	3.8	2.6	1.6	1.4
Nigeria	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.6
Ghana	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Ivory Coast	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.2
Somalia	0.9	1.2	1.6	2.0
Others	8.1	9.1	9.8	10.4


Source: Elaboration by ISMU of data from UN/WB/ILO

is what the two hypotheses take account of – and different GDP trends in the countries of origin and in the countries of destination of the flows.

So, as we see, there is a hardcore of about 350,000 people whose immigration can be regarded as almost inevitable: these are immigrants from the African continent and especially sub-Saharan Africa. Research indicates the same dynamics for Italy, where at least 50,000 people can be expected to arrive from Africa and in particular sub-Saharan Africa.

This broad picture for the situation in Italy indicates that immigration will very likely double from the figure of 5 million with which we started. Thus we shouldn't imagine that the phenomenon is going to stabilise. Whether people like it or not, Italy is probably destined to have a continually growing presence of foreigners.

Figure 22. Net migration balance related to Italian citizens: 2002-2010. Data from ISTAT contained in «Survey on policies relating to Italian citizens residing abroad (*)» show how responsibility for the transformation of the migratory balance from positive to negative is attributable to the age group 20-39 years. The same source also highlights the strong growth in the proportion of graduates among Italian citizens moving abroad over the same time period: rising, at a continually growing rate, from 8.3% in 2001 to 15.9% in 2010




(*) Testimony from the President of ISTAT at the Italian senate – Committee for issues concerning Italians abroad, Rome, 13 June 2013

Source: ISTAT

6. Not only immigration

To conclude, after trying to go «beyond Lampedusa», let us also try to go beyond immigration. We have grown used to talking about Italy as a country of immigration, but today it is right to consider it once again also as a country of emigration. The cardboard suitcases of the past have gone and the emigrants now are young men and women with relatively high educa-

Figure 23. Percentage of Italians with doctorates who obtained the qualification in 2004 and 2006 and who in 2009 were thinking of leaving Italy within 12 months



Source: ISTAT. Testimony from the President of ISTAT at the Italian senate, *Committee for issues concerning Italians abroad*, Rome, 13 June 2013

tional qualifications who head to London and Berlin, Paris and the United States (Figure 22). They represent a resource for our country and this can be seen fairly clearly if we consider the numbers of people with doctorates (Figure 23). It is true that horizons have broadened, frontiers are more permeable and it is a good thing to travel, encounter new situations and gather experience. However the risk that we are running is that of exporting our brains (and perhaps a country like ours, all things considered, could make use of some brains).

Chapter III


Paweł Kaczmarczyk
Vice Director of the Centre of Migration Research,
University of Warsaw

I will follow somehow professor Blangiardo's steps: the title of his presentation was *Beyond Lampedusa* and I will move even further, beyond Italy. My aim here is to look at the whole issue of European immigration, and to look at it from the economic and demographic perspective. At the very end I will refer to the «liberal paradox», so called by Hollifield and I guess this will create a kind of link between my presentation and the next one.

Let me start with a maybe rude overview, but I believe it will be important for my paper and I hope also for the rest of our discussion here. Probably you know that if we discuss of recent migration worldwide, quite often we speak about migration systems and apparently, in the case of Europe, we also have a kind of migration system and this migration system is also very specific.

First of all: it's very embedded in common history – with very strong and lasting imprint of the post World War II recruitment programs, which is particularly visible in countries like Germany, France or the Netherlands –, that migration has a vital role in compensating the demographic deficit (as just discussed in the previous speech). However, still there is a high propensity to migrate, particularly in several European countries.

Figure 1. Europe as a migration area. International migration by category of entry, selected OECD countries, 2005. Percentage of total inflows




Source: International Migration Outlook

A second aspect concerns the very strong intraregional interdependencies: so we have kind of sub-systems or mini-systems, for example we have a mini-system of the post-soviet countries; southern european countries present their kind of sub-system as well.

Then we observe a very strong importance of the South-North divide and this is exactly what we are discussing here today. Last but not least, there is a deep diversity in migration flows and this is what I would like to draw attention for a while.

In Figure 1 a division of inflows of migrants by categories of entry is shown, just for 2005, that is before the crisis. Apparently we see here a whole of variety of migration movements in

Figure 2. Europe as a migration area. Foreign-born population in selected European countries, 1995-2005



Source: International Migration Outlook

different countries. In some countries, like United Kingdom, most people just come to work, in others – like for example in Norway – quite a large share is constituted of people who come for humanitarian reasons; in case of Italy most of migrants come for work and also as accompanying family members. So this is quite important in the context of my presentation: there is nothing like a general picture or general conclusion for the whole Europe; in every single case we have to look into details in the situation of a given country.


As before commented by professor Blangiardo, in Figure 2 is shown the situation in Europe in terms of stocks of migrants. If we just take a look at the bars combined we see that apparently the countries with the highest shares of immigrants are German speaking countries like Germany or Austria and Scandinavian countries. Let me stress the attention to the red

dots represented in Figure 2 and in particular to those of the southern European countries; here the red dots indicate the countries which experienced the largest increase in scale of migration in the period 1995-2005.

This is related to the concept of European migration cycle, which is also quite commonly used in migration studies, and – interestingly enough – mentioned by Professor Blangiardo as well. If we look at the European migration in total, we can distinguish at least three groups of countries. The first group is of the old immigration countries (like for example France, Germany and Austria); those countries became net immigration countries far before 1975. The second group is constituted by countries like Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, and these are exactly «new immigration countries». Then we have also countries – particularly from central and eastern Europe – which could be defined as «future immigration countries», because some of them still hasn't changed its migration status. Why is it so important? It's not only about scale of migration, it's not only about trends of migration, it's about migration challenges. For example: in case of old immigration countries what we see today is a kind of crisis of the multiculturalism; in the case of new immigration countries, serious challenge is the transformation of immigrants (quite often illegal immigrants), into settlers. In the case of central and eastern Europe, challenges are completely different, in fact the scale of immigration here is still too low. However, sometimes this picture can be blurred; that's why it is also important, as we are doing in this seminar, to talk extensively about cases as Lampedusa.

However, also in central and eastern Europe such cases may appear: quite recently Bulgaria experienced a massive inflow of people as a consequence of the so called Sirian crisis. In Poland these days we discuss very often the case of Ukraine and potential inflow in forthcoming months. In fact the picture is not that clear, as you see in Figure 3. In fact what I will discuss in my presentation is somehow related to the migration development debate. However, I will just focus on few important

Figure 3. Europe as a migration area: European Migration Cycle




issues: related to the demographic impact and to the economic impact, concerning the labour market and then the welfare state.

If we speak about demography, I think it's quite important to look into the past and the past means early 1990s. In early 1990s in Europe in quite many countries the share of immigrants was already very substantial. Furthermore, many of them were people coming from distant places (also culturally), like Africa or Asia. At that time the idea of a zero-immigration policy for a fortress Europe was first proposed and I guess it's somehow coming back also today.

However, more or less at the same time a completely different approach was proposed and it was strongly related to the demographic situation of Europe. In the very well-known 2000 United Nations report called *Replacement migration as a solution to population aging* the central idea was, first of all, to propose a demographic forecast whose outcome ended to be striking

Figure 4. Components of total population growth in EU27 and OECD countries, 1960-2020



Source: Gagnon 2014

because it's simply projected a severe decline in population in most of the European and not only European countries. And the next question was: what could be the role of immigration? Or – in simpler words – whether we should have or should expect something like replacement-role of migration. And the answer was very clear: no. Extremely high and additionally constant flows of immigrants would be needed to maintain the size of the working age population. In fact we could stop here, because this is the general conclusion: immigration, in demographic terms, is not an ultimate solution.

However, it could be a part of the policy mix, including for example the so called behaviour of majors (like participation rates, retirement age or family policy), but – and this is the most important issue here – in short and medium term migration may play a very vital role in demographic processes.

This is exactly what you see in Figure 4: looking at the graph of EU27 it becomes apparent that in fact if in past decades we had an increase in number of people of Europe, it was mostly because of migration. Considering the issue country by country, this is well visible in southern Europe. So, in short and medium term, apparently, migration is very important.

If we look into the future, the outcome could be also quite important. In Figure 5 is shown the outcome of the forecast called «EUROPOP2008» and apparently if you look here the

Figure 5. Demographic impacts of immigration according to the EUROPOP2008, in millions

	Births	Deaths	Natural change	Net migration	Total change	Population (2061)
With migration	255	305	-50	59	9	505
Without migration	219	301	-82	0	-82	414
Difference	36	4	32	59	91	91

Source: Lanzieri 2009

net migration project until to 2060 is around 60 million in the total Europe. However the total change if we also consider that reproduction of future immigrants will be around 90 millions as for the whole Europe. It is a huge change also in quantitative terms for Europe, as such.


Apparently, these changes will be different for the various countries. In Figure 6 there is the projected share not only of foreigners, but also of people with foreign background, that means foreigners and the first and second generation as well. Nowadays countries like Italy or Spain still do not have very high share of immigrants, but they will have such a high shares soon.

Here we are discussing mostly about forced migration, migration for humanitarian reasons, but still we should try to understand that migration is simply our future and in quite many countries it is also the present day.

As already commented by Professor Blangiardo, if we try to assess what could be the impact of future immigration, we could translate the total number of migrants into life years contribution of migrants as shown in Figure 7 for education, Figure 8 for labour market activity and Figure 9 for retirement.


A few comments on these figures: Figure 7 shows that both Italy and Spain are the two countries that will experience the most important flows of immigrants in the future. Import-

Figure 6. Projected share of persons with foreign background in the EU27, model 1, 2011-2061 (in %)




Source: Lanzieri 2011

Figure 7. Life-years contribution of immigrants in terms of education, 2010-2020



Source: Kaczmarczyk 2014, based on ISMU 2013

Figure 8. Life-years contribution of immigrants in terms of labour market activity, 2010-2020




Source: Kaczmarczyk 2014, based on ISMU 2013

antly, if we just take a look at the education and labour market figures, both cases may mean either a blessing or a curse; it depends in fact on how we are able to use the potential related to migration.

Figure 9 is very interesting and it was also commented by professor Blangiardo: we speak here about life-years contribution of immigrants in terms of retirement. Apparently Italy is an outlier: if we just consider age structure of immigrants (recent and future immigrants), in the future the country will face very serious challenges related to aging migrants. This is what we called important aging, in fact.

Figure 10 refers not only to quantity but also to quality. Recent discussions in Europe focus almost exclusively on highly-skilled migrants. Here total requirements are shown, up to 2020, by qualification level: it's apparent that the need of

Figure 9. Life-years contribution of immigrants in terms of retirement, 2010-2020




Source: Kaczmarczyk 2014 based on ISMU 2013

people with high qualifications is growing quite seriously. However, still the most important group remains the medium qualifications one; additionally in future we will need (and we will need heavily) people with low skills as well. So, this is the picture: apparently, in political terms it is very easy to speak about people who are well or highly skilled, however in fact we need the whole range of skills for the future of our labour markets.


Since normally the focus is on western Europe, and because I come from Warsaw, I just would like to add a few words about central and eastern Europe as well. In Figure 11 there is a picture showing old age dependency ratio: the ratio of those people who are out of the labour market and those who are in productive age. The green line represents the old age dependency ratio for 2060 which is supposed to be over 50% already by that time.

Figure 10. Total requirements by qualification level, projected changes 2006-2020, in millions, EU25



Source: Kaczmarczyk 2014 based on CEDEFOP 2008


Figure 11. Old-age dependency ratio, 2008, 2035 & 2060



We have here two very interesting groups of countries. On one hand we have the group of western European and southern European countries, with the lowest fertility, so with a extremely low reproduction rate. Some of these countries however experience very massive inflow of immigrants. On the other hand we have central and eastern European countries like Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, where not only there are very low reproduction rates, but also massive outflows of people. These countries will suffer a huge demographic problems in the very near future. I am telling this here in Rome for one simple reason, because people from Romania, particularly, are one of the most important immigrant groups. However, these groups will definitely diminish over the next ten or twenty years. One reason is in the demographic potential of the country as shown here.

I would like to spend a few words on the labour market also. The public debate, the common messages, on this issue are clear and striking at the same time: immigrants compete with native workers; inflows of inworkers can reduce the number of available jobs, apparently contributing to the reduction of wage level and potentially increasing unemployment. So goes the common message. However, if we look at the economic theory the issue is far more complicated, in fact only in a very basic model we should expect effects like these. The whole issue is purely empirical and the most important point refers to a couple of very simple questions: what's the structure of the labour market? That is, how segmented is it? And again: where the foreigners act as complements or rather substitutes, in relation to the natives? So: how does it look like, in empirical terms? I will not comment all the studies, because the message is quite simple. If you look at the US labour market it seems that the impact of immigrants on the employment's opportunities of the native workers is moderate or negligible. In case of european labour market the impact is usually slightly higher, but only slightly. In some cases it's even positive.

Figure 12. Post-enlargement migration experience. EU8 and EU2 migrants as a % of the receiving population. Elaboration based on NIESR 2011




I will just briefly comment on the following case: as you know, in 2004 and 2007 the European Union experienced two enlargement rounds, together meaning for the European Union over 25 percentage change in the overall number of population. So now the question is: what was the impact of the post-enlargement flows on the European labour market? I mean in all European member states.

Figure 12 is about the scale of the inflow. Two stories can be read here. There are two countries which experienced the most massive inflow from central-eastern Europe: Ireland and United Kingdom. But Spain and Italy witness important migration experiences as well, mostly related to the second enlargement round in 2007.

How migrants formed the labour market? This is strikingly different from the central point of our discussion today because most of the migrants are simply workers and they are

Figure 13. Post-enlargement migration experience-impacts. The figure shows: *a)* positive effects for receiving, negative or neutral for sending countries; *b)* moderate impacts in the short-run, negligible in the long-run; *c)* significant differences between NMS8 and NMS2




Source: Brücker *et al.* 2009

very special workers since they have higher labour market participation rates, higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates than the population either in the sending or receiving countries. Figure 13 helps to assess the impacts of the post-enlargement migrations.

The black bars indicate impacts on EU15 countries; apparently in terms of GDP the impact was positive, in terms of unemployment and wages it was purely negligible. So, in fact, it seems that immigrant countries can benefit seriously from migration, depending on what type of migration we are talking about.

Figure 14 shows the impacts for particular countries. Here we have a pure success story with the case of Ireland and the United Kingdom. It seems that also Italy was able to gain from

Figure 14. Post-enlargement migration experience-impacts



Source: NIESR 2011

migration in the post-enlargement period particularly in the case migration from Romania and Bulgaria.

The last issue is the welfare state. Again, if we consider public debate the message is quite similar to the case of labour market: immigrants rely on public welfare and social services paying relatively little in the form of taxes or welfare contributions and simply relying on social benefits. Apparently this is not only rhetoric, not only media message, in fact this argument is quite widely used to restrict immigration or right of immigrants. This was the case of Ireland and United Kingdom in 2004 and it's exactly happening now when we look at what is going on between European Commission and United Kingdom regarding immigration.

So the question here is: is really immigration a net fiscal burden for receiving societies? I will not go into details of the theory. Apparently we have here two opposing views. On one side some


people say that it's in the very logic of the national welfare system to be a closed system. Hence we should prevent immigrants from joining our system. However, on the other side, people like Storesletten suggest that immigration can be critical to resolve recent and future problems of our welfare systems. And again, within theoretical literature there is no consensus.

What really matters is the so called «net fiscal position» of immigrants when we compare what they pay and what they receive in forms of benefits. So, what is empirical literature saying? First of all, outcomes are not robust and there are significant differences between countries, between countries with different institutional frameworks. Apparently countries with very generous systems can lose in terms of welfare. The rest isn't evident. Probably the most important outcome here is a very simple one: the net fiscal impact of immigration is small, around 1% of GDP. According to this, quite many scholars say that this doesn't provide the base for the creation of any migration policy in Europe.

Importantly, when we look at fiscal situation of immigrants it seems that their fiscal position is determined first of all by the structure of immigration, secondly by their labour market integration (and that's obvious), but also, as I said, by the structure of the welfare system, by its message and particularly generosity. This is why for example scandinavian countries usually suffer from immigration, while United Kingdom or Ireland gain a lot. However, it is also really important to consider long term perspectives, or dynamic perspectives, and include the issue of the pension system as well.

Figure 15 comes from a research by OECD and represents the difference between immigrants and native born in terms of average net direct contributions to the welfare state. So the result is positive for many countries immigrants paying more than natives in form of contributions. The blue dots here indicate the ordinary difference while the red dots indicate the difference when considering pension system. In most cases, if we go country by country, including also southern European countries, and we

Figure 15. Migration and the welfare state. Differences in the average net direct contributions between immigrant and native-born households (2007-2009 averages, OECD countries)



Source: OECD 2013

include pension systems into the analysis, it seems that immigrants contribute significantly to our system, in a positive way.

Unfortunately I do not have a study for Italy methodologically well prepared, but I have a very good study for Spain, showing the impact of immigrants on the welfare of the country. Let me comment it very briefly in face of a certain complicity of the issue. In Figure 16 three scenarios are shown: a benchmark scenario with 60,000 immigrants per year, a second scenario with no immigration after 2000, and a third one with large immigration. The Figure calculate the changes needed to keep the same budget deficit. If numbers are just compared it becomes apparent that in fact migration can be very helpful in terms of sustain of the welfare systems. The differences here are almost twice as high in the case the State tries to limit migration and not to increase its volumes. I guess this study is

Figure 16. Migration and the welfare state: the case of Spain. Changes necessary to keep the balanced budget under conditions of ageing population and immigration (3 scenarios)

Fiscal policy changes	All burden on future generations	Immediate change
Benchmark scenario (60,000 immigrants per year)		
% change in taxes and transfers	20.4	4.7
% change in taxes only	34.5	7.9
% change in transfers only	49.8	11.3
No immigration after 2000		
% change in taxes and transfers	27.6	5.1
% change in taxes only	47.8	8.8
% change in transfers only	65.4	12.4
200,000 immigrants per year		
% change in taxes and transfers	12.0	3.8
% change in taxes only	19.8	6.3
% change in transfers only	30.3	9.2

Source: Collado *et al.* 2004, 347

very interesting when it shows how important migration could be when we consider the dynamic future perspectives.

In terms of demography this is what we know from empirical studies: that immigration is not an ultimate solution, but apparently it is and should be also part of a policy mix. In terms of labour market we know that impacts on the receiving countries are moderate or negligible, however apparently some sectorial derivation is possible: there are always winners and losers and this is what politicians are using quite often.

The most important factor here is that already today for most European economies, immigrants are structural complements of the labour market, so they are simply indispensable. So, quite mainly labour markets are simply dependent on foreigners and we will not change it, not over a very short time horizon.

Welfare impacts are crucial in the long term. However in short term they are rather negligible and I would say rather positive. But the point is apparently that not only economic factors matter and this is what James Hollifield called «liberal paradox». On one hand when we consider western European and also American economies, we observe enormous needs in terms of labour market and also demography. On the other hand migration brings also a lot of further impacts, social, political and cultural impacts unveiling the paradox between labour market needs and factors linked to other components of the society. This is exactly the area of migration policy and maybe this is the reason why it's so controversial and so difficult.

Chapter IV

Yves Pascouau

*Director of Migration & Mobility Policies,
European Policy Centre, Bruxelles*

I will start today by saying something which came to my mind while listening to the previous speakers: the more I think about migration related issues, the more I find them complex. But when I look at this complexity it becomes clear that the ways to get out of this situation are at EU level solely, while at the moment (and I will come back on this later on) it looks like a kind of blocked situation.

My contribution to this seminar *Lampedusa-Europe: a common way* is entitled *Origins and Characteristics of the Migrations in the Mediterranean Area* and around this title it will be moving. I will try to address that issue through three parts. First the context, in order to understand what we are talking about; second, what I called the reaction, which is solely what has been done so far; and third the actions which should be done at the EU level (in the next days, months, decades or centuries...).

1. Context

I think that the context should be framed around the two main elements regarding origins and characteristics. It is pretty clear that the origins of the migrations in the Mediterranean sea are extremely diverse. It is clear that people crossing the Mediterranean Sea come from different regions of the world, the Medi-

terranean regions for Sirians and Palestinians for instance, the horn of Africa, the sub-Saharan countries and even further East, from Pakistan, Afghanistan or Bangladesh.

However, we can consider that if we focus on what is happening today there are four characteristics.

First, the vast majority of people smuggled by sea in the Mediterranean area are asylum seekers. This is important because it is not a question of migration; it is an issue of international protection, which triggers different behaviours but also – and particularly different – instruments at EU level, which are instruments related to international protection based on the Geneva convention.

Second characteristic: I think we need to keep in mind the magnitude of the phenomenon. The phenomenon we're experiencing today is extremely high, it is significant. It is not as high as what Germany experienced in the 1990s, where the country was welcoming a very huge amount of asylum seekers coming from the Balkans. Still we have to understand and to acknowledge that today the magnitude of the phenomenon is clearly high. One element which has to be further considered is that we don't know to which extent this magnitude will expand. What is going to happen in Libya, for instance, what is going to happen in different regions of the world, what is going to happen if Turkey tomorrow says to the European Union «we stop protecting Syrian refugees we have already on our territory»? We don't really know what is going to happen on the roads towards the European Union. The magnitude of the phenomenon may be even higher in future than today.

Given this situation – here comes the third issue – the question is if we are equipped with the appropriate tools and policies at EU level? No, I've my doubts about that. The fact that we have been able to adopt, I wouldn't say «policies», but at least rules in the field of migration and asylum over the last 15 years doesn't imply that we are equipped for managing such phenomenons. If we have a look backwards, all the major instruments, tools and rules which have been adopted since

1999 – when the European Union was awarded the competence to set rules in the field of migration and asylum – were adopted in a completely different situation from now. For this reason, I am not entirely sure that the tools we have today are the ones that are clearly suitable to manage the situation.

Fourth issue: if we do not have the right tools and policies, are we able to adopt those tools and policies appropriately? Here, again, I have my doubts: it is apparent today (as remarked in the previous speeches also) that the economic crisis hit very hard the European Union member countries and their State orders. There is no need to further develop this concept here in Italy, neither in Greece or in Spain, or in Portugal.

The crisis manifests its impact not only at the economic level but also in the territories of politics. There is clearly a political contraction taking place today in the member states. It is apparent that anti-establishment, anti-migration, anti-EU parties are setting the agenda and the agenda is much closer to the immigration zero theory than to an open migration theory. I think that we should keep it in mind: our policy agenda in several EU member states is driven by extreme right parties and this is particularly the case of the country I'm coming from, France. It is not a surprise that the extreme right is driving the agenda, since the Front National and other similar parties are making the front pages of the newspapers on a daily basis. Since they are part of the political spectrum and in the political game they are able (unfortunately, in my personal point of view) to set the agenda, and not in the right direction.

2. Reaction

The situation is then far from being the best both at EU level and in the member states: not being able to act, we are just able to react and we are reacting today to the emergency in the Mediterranean sea. The reaction we can take a look at, is mainly to be seen in different political documents or actions which have been adopted at EU level and in the member states:

- the Task Force on the Mediterranean sea – TFM –, established by the member states under the coordination of the European Commission, which is an operational task force;
- the well known Mare Nostrum operation, which is Italian;
- the October 2014, name for a Council which adopted conclusions on the way to better manage migration flows and which is extremely interesting because it is only focused on how to manage arrival at the external borders;
- the Triton operation today.

All these operations consist in experiences of mere reaction, limited in scope and focused on border management issues. We see here financial and human support from the Union, from member states, from the new instruments created at EU level (like the Smartborders system). But all these actions are clearly focused on border management. They are also focused on one element well known here in Italy, which is the Dublin system.

Finally, all the discussions which are related to how to manage migration flows are only focused on these two elements. The problem is that this is not forward-looking and not really innovative.

3. Action

What are the innovations we can talk about? What are the innovations that have been touched upon in the past, but aren't taking place today or aren't taking place at the level they should?

One idea is to create legal venues for people seeking for protection in Europe. This sounds fine, but where are we witnessing concrete actions in this direction? People talk about humanitarian visa; the new Commission on Migration and Home Affairs introduced the idea of using EU delegations outside of Europe in order to enable people to lodge asylum applications. None of these solutions was clearly implemented.

The question of resettlements is also a regular one within the debate. But with a closer look, I think that the number of resettled people from outside Europe into Europe is around 15,000 people, involving not all of the EU member states. In recent conversations with American representatives emerged that they are going to launch a program to resettle 70,000 refugees from these regions to the US. One country covers 70,000 people, some EU member states 15,000 people. There is a clear discrepancy here and a lot to do in this regard.

What about relocation? We know that some of our member states are suffering from an inflow of a huge number of refugees. What to do with those who are recognized as refugees and who may be entitled to live in other member states, not only to be better integrated, but also to alleviate the burden their presence creates on national systems?

Another innovative solution which could be put on the table and which perhaps will not be discussed further here is the question of the Dublin regulation. We should simply think about making the Dublin mechanism a little bit more flexible. Can't we think about the fact that the definition of family members in the Dublin regulation is extremely narrow focused on the nuclear family (even not including brothers and sisters)? Could we imagine that a group of member states – five, four, ten, twelve, fifteen member states – accept together to interpret the Dublin regulation in a more flexible way and take on their territory those people who are family members – cousins, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts...? It's just a matter of interfering in a broad manner in a framework that is already existing; the Dublin regulation doesn't prevent member states to do so. It's just a matter of knowing that there is a humanitarian interpretation to the Dublin regulation which could be triggered by member states, in order to help those member states who are facing difficulties. Could we also imagine that the Dublin regulation might be turned towards an integration perspective? Considering that we have Syrian asylum seekers arriving in our territory, or Eritreans, or Somalians and so on, people who

have 90% (not to say 100%) chance to receive a refugee status, shouldn't we consider that they could perhaps be distributed among the member states, on the basis of criteria other than those enshrined into the Dublin regulation?

We know that language, communities, work opportunities or family situations are different criterias which may be implemented in order to turn the Dublin regulation not only into a distribution tool, but also into an integration tool. Those people will remain on our territory and they will have to integrate in one or in another territory; there are criteria and elements which make their integration easier.

Is that a surprise that we only react to what is happening in the surroundings of the European Union and our territories? No! Because it is a matter of fact that there is no policy at the EU level. But it is not a surprise as there is no policy in the member states either, as in my country for instance.

However, if we do consider that migration is our future as Paweł Kaczmarczyk said before, we should acknowledge that trying to manage migration at national level is something like a nonsense. We understand it when we see migration from the perspective of Luxemburg or Belgium and then take a look to the phenomenon at global scale. Is it a ten million country inhabitants in itself able to manage migration flows taking place worldwide in terms of size and magnitude? I have my doubts. Is it realistic to continue thinking that Belgium, again, will be able to manage migration flows on its own, at the same time being part of a project where people are free to move within a common area, like the European area? The nonsense make apparent the need to think at EU level.

We need also to think along the lines of the title of this conference, because it was extremely interesting to read the origins and characteristics of the migrations in the Mediterranean, taken not as a sea, but as an area. I believe that the title of this conference invite us to broaden the scope of our own thinking about migrations and areas in order to establish a common EU policy, at last.

In order to do so there is no magic recipe, no crystal ball. However, I have some ideas because I'm working in a think-tank, it is my job. Most of my ideas are thrown into the air, into the debate and then forgotten once people have left the room; but I'm keeping thinking out loud and trying to frame the ideas on how we can finally establish a common EU migration and asylum policy. I think there are four steps to be taken.

First, we need to map, to understand and to plan. We really need to consider that the migration phenomenon will not stop and that planning shouldn't be for the next couple of months or years, but for the next 10-15 to 20 years, at least. Planning and understanding helps to act. This is clearly one way we should investigate, one way we should start thinking about. What is it going to be the world like in the next 20 years? No one has clear answers. There are some ideas; our politicians at the EU level say that we have to take into account the instability and the demographic changing. That's fine, but not enough. What is the impact on migration of the various elements changing our lives on a daily basis and tremendously affecting the mobility of people? The digital age, climate change, the urbanization of the world and the rise of the middle class: all these elements will have a strong impact on people's mobility. We have to frame all these phenomenon in order to be able to know how we should react, how we should shape our policy responses.

Then, we need to define the objectives we want to reach. For the time being I'm not that sure that we've been able at the EU level to define the objectives. I believe that there are two objectives we should think about firmly: mobility and protection. We should focus on mobility both to and within the European Union. This is something which is not on the table today. How do we admit people in the European Union on a common base? How do we deal with our partners from the imminent neighborhood of the EU? How do we permit (as it was said before) people to move within the European Union, in order to allow people to know that once they will be admitted at one stage, they will

also be able – like EU citizens – to move within the EU? In fact we are trying at the same time to set up a common European labour market from which many of third country nationals are excluded from. So, we really need to think the idea of mobility to and within Europe in a proper manner.

How do we provide and manage protection? Protection is a magic word because it is a word which has a double meaning. There is protection for our citizens; this is the job of the States and the European Union: to protect people on its territory. This is a demand from citizens: citizens want to be protected and we all understand this. So, this is a duty of the European Union and of the members state to protect all the people residing on its territory. But there is also the due to protect people that need help in our territory and outside the Union as well.

Here is the third step that we need to think about: how do we connect the fields inside and outside migration policies? We really need to connect dots between different policy fields, not only legal and regular migration and international protection, but also to combine these policies within the framework of integration. This is a big – and perhaps the biggest – challenge that the European Union member states will have to face. It's one thing to adopt rules to define who is entitled to enter, reside and who has to «live» the territory. It's far more difficult to understand and to help integration, because it involves many political issues, education, health, culture, access to labour market. Facing integration triggers also the involvement of many different players and actors. This is the reason why I think that integration is perhaps one of the biggest challenges the European Union member states will have to face in a next couple of years.

But we also have to think about the outside form and impact of migration policies, not only their relationship with third countries (this has been also discussed today) but their link to other EU policies that may have a consequence on migration of people. What is the impact of the common agricultural

policy outside of the European territory and on the fact that some people are forced to move because of this policy? What is the impact of EU development policy on migration of people? What is the impact of EU trade policy on the movement of people? We have not been able so far to connect the various policy fields and this is something which needs to be done.

Last, but not least, we need also to organize all these issues within the institutional framework at the EU level and this is also something which is becoming more and more difficult and more and more complex. In the good old times we had the so called «institution triangle»: the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. But over the last years saw the arrival of two other major institutions, which are going to play a crucial role in this field: the Court of Justice of course, but also the European External Action Service. So we have now to rethink the European institutional coherence, not in terms of triangle, even not in terms of a square, but in terms of an institutional pentagon, where – from my own perspective – the European External Action Service is going to play a more and more significant and perhaps leading role, in terms of migration management.

4. Conclusions

I think that if the European Union wants to take up the challenge of migration management in a globalized world with major challenges coming ahead it needs now to take the steps towards mapping, understanding, planning and defining the objectives and priorities. The problem is that we are not about to see that happening, I am sorry to say. I will finish the speech linking it up with what has been said by Professor Codini: in order to accomplish these goals we would need to have mutual trust all together and the problem is that nowadays at EU level mutual trust does not exist. We will have to keep on working, with our tools, with what we have today. We will keep on reacting, which has proven to work for the time being but until

when we don't know. We are not able at the moment to have a forward-looking position, a common EU position and a common answer to human mobility in Europe, within Europe and worldwide.

Part II

*The New Balance
of the Mediterranean Area*

Chapter I

Angelino Alfano
President of the De Gasperi Foundation
Minister of the Interior of the Italian Republic

Our aim here today is to offer some thoughts based on the title of this seminar *Lampedusa-Europe: a common way*. In the first place, I would like to say to President Dzurinda that I myself am practically a native of Lampedusa, being from that Province, the Province of Agrigento. Lampedusa is a very special place for me, not only as a physical place but also in some way as a place of the soul, where I spent all the best holidays of my boyhood. In those wonderful days in the heat of an African sun, and a sea like the Caribbean all around, I could never have imagined that one day I would have to return to my homeland as the Minister of the Interior to shed tears over dozens, indeed hundreds, of bodies in bags, and in one of those bags to find not one body but two because there was a child clinging to his mother's body. At that moment I realized once and for all that Italy had to do something more, something more which Europe had not yet done.

This speech is intended to be above all a testimony, the testimony of someone who, faced with those bodies, understood beyond any doubt that more had to be done and that human dignity is a value which cannot be trampled upon and cancelled out whatever the circumstances.

The people of Lampedusa have built in the extreme South of the island an arch, a veritable gate, and they have called

it the «Gate to Europe». They have called it so because that arch symbolises the idea that it is the first point of entry to Europe. And so I want to reflect on that gate in the South of Lampedusa, which is in the South of the Province of Agrigento, which in turn is in the South of Sicily and so on. I want to think of that gate as a new Checkpoint Charlie. Anyone who is from that part of Europe, where President Mikuláš Dzurinda – the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovakia – comes from, will remember with absolute clarity both the physical significance and the political and symbolic significance of Checkpoint Charlie. When that checkpoint was pulled down what finally came down, in fact, was the very idea that the Second World War had never really ended: it had been the checkpoint built after the Second World War to divide the world into East and West.

This new Checkpoint Charlie separates the North and the South of the world and represents a crossing point that thousands and thousands of young people want to pass to enter Europe. Unfortunately today this is not only young people seeking work but above all people fleeing from wars and persecutions. At this moment I am thinking, with special feeling, about Christian victims of persecution in various parts of the world and all those, Christians and non-Christians, who are being persecuted for their religious faith and the God they believe in. Christians are suffering in a way that takes us back two thousand years. Our historical age confronts us with similar dramas which have never ended and it is this period of history that we are called upon to reckon with.

Italy has responded by setting up an operation called Mare Nostrum, which ended on November 1st. This operation cost one hundred and fourteen million euros and enabled us to save over 100,000 human lives. Given this current situation, Italy has fought a hard battle in Europe, also during Italy's turn at holding the EU Presidency, to push the EU into taking a decision that it had never done before, a decision of great political significance: to engage its own naval and aerial forces,

and its own physical participation through technical specialists, down there on the Mediterranean border.

The political significance is enormous because these ships and these resources are located thirty miles from the Schengen border. This means that Europe recognizes that that border is not the Italian border but the European border. This idea is fundamental for us because it affirms that we are the border of Europe and that border must be defended. In the history of the world, in fact, there has never been an experiment with United States or a confederation or union of States where internal borders have been eliminated without then defending the external ones.

Through Schengen we have eliminated internal borders, now we must define and defend the external ones. It is a great challenge and one which will demand certain requirements. The first of these is major investment in the challenge of cooperating with nations outside, and I am pleased that we have here diplomatic representatives from countries on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Through cooperation with external nations we must achieve the objective of closing down the biggest and most macabre travel agency in the world, that of the human traffickers who exploit the needs of those who want to reach checkpoint Lampedusa, of those who want to escape from wars and persecutions, by making them pay for a passage without telling them about the risks that they run on the journey and often abusing the women, even in front of their children. We have to shut down these macabre travel agencies and we can do this through the actions and the powerful presence of European foreign policy in collaboration with those countries in that region of the world, north Africa and the Middle East, with whom it is possible to cooperate.

The other great question is a solution to the Libyan crisis. From the Horn of Africa tens of thousands of people make their way northwards until they arrive in Libya because they know that this is the corridor opening up the passage to the

gateway to Europe, in other words Lampedusa. In this case, too, there is a challenge for foreign policy. This double foreign policy challenge, involving cooperation both with countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and with those of sub-Saharan Africa, is crucial for stabilization in Libya.

This cooperation is essential in order to succeed in dealing with the central problem of illegal and irregular migration, which must be opposed, and at the same time handling the issue of asylum seekers and refugees, which must be managed. One phenomenon must be opposed and the other must be managed and it must all be done with a sense of vision, knowing that the ultimate objective is to eradicate that macabre travel agency.

During the course of the Mare Nostrum operation, police have arrested 750 people smugglers, 750 merchants of death – and the head of the state police force is here today. We have confiscated their «mother ships» (called mothers because their holds contain small boats which are released to drift near the rescue ships).

These steps having been taken, we now need to accomplish something which is a European vision. Illegal immigration is being opposed; asylum seekers and refugees, on the other hand, must be managed as a matter of international law and human rights, over and above selfish national interests. To this end we began last week two parallel sets of negotiations and an initiative which is completely unprecedented.

The two parallel negotiations were carried out on the one hand with the countries of central Africa and on the other with those of northern and eastern Africa. These negotiations, one known as the Khartoum Process and the other as the Rabat Process, were concluded with two Declarations in Rome, the fundamental pillars of which are the reception of refugees and the fight against merchants of death. Here in Rome we have achieved the important objective of getting countries which are not used to communicating at a diplomatic level to talk to one another. It has been a great result.

In addition we have launched the idea, in our view a highly effective blow to the death merchants, of setting up refugee camps directly on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and with the presence of international and humanitarian organizations, so that a selection can be made there of those who have the right to asylum and those who do not. To do this we will need the help of countries which offer greater stability in the region. Asylum seekers will thus no longer be forced to pay for passage from the most murderous and macabre travel agency in the world.

Among other things we arranged a bilateral summit meeting between our Prime Minister and President al-Sisi – Mohammed Shaker is here today as a representative of the Egyptian Republic. I myself have been to Tunisia and Egypt specifically to encourage bilateral relations between countries who are in a position to help and receive in return greater stability in their region and the defeat of criminal organizations.

In addition to the Khartoum and Rabat Process, a further initiative has been undertaken with those countries in the two zones of Africa, in continuity with the first meeting of the Italian EU Presidency held in Milan in July. On that occasion we said: «There cannot be a foreign policy in this matter which is not linked to domestic policy based on security rules and the responsibility of the Ministers of the Interior. However a policy of the Ministers of the Interior which is not grounded in foreign policy is totally inadequate: these two components on their own are insufficient». We therefore organized a first coordinating meeting using a format called «jumbo conference», which included the participation of the High Representative for Foreign Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the Commissioner for Immigration, Dimitri Avramopoulos together with EU foreign Ministers and Ministers of the Interior. This too was an extremely important event which has led to a new phase.

The other great question linked to today's subject – and I want to open up in our discussion here only those questions which I feel are really important – is international terrorism. On

the route to Lampedusa we also have to take steps against the risk of terrorism. There are other routes, for example through the Balkans, and it was specifically this matter that we dealt with this morning in a summit with countries of the western Balkans. So, while other routes also exist, we are talking here today about the central Mediterranean: we must do everything to prevent the risk of migrant flows being infiltrated by aspiring terrorists or terrorists already radicalised and recruited. These steps have already been taken but they are putting current European rules to a severe test. In fact these need to be changed and an effort must be made to find a point of balance between important rights which are not theoretically in conflict but which, in this matter, risk becoming contradictory. I am referring, for example, to the rights of free movement and security. These raise problems about the introduction of the *Passenger name record*, a European directive not yet discussed by Parliament concerning the prospect of registering passengers in transit within the Schengen area. It is a very important initiative but one which risks bringing into conflict the right of security with that of free movement, just as the right of security is potentially in contrast with the right of privacy.

So these are the challenges today. And, with regard to them, we put forward once again the idea that protecting ourselves together with Europe, in company with Europe and in close relationship with other countries of the Mediterranean, and ensuring that there is collective action, makes both Italy and Europe much more secure than they would be with the opposing idea of «everyone acting for themselves». In this particular case, President Dzurida, the old Italian saying «chi fa da sé fa per tre» (if you want a thing done well, do it yourself) just isn't true. We protect ourselves better together, not on our own; we protect ourselves better if security systems are governed by a population of hundreds of millions of inhabitants with governments who talk to each other within common institutions. Certainly they have to be reinforced, improved and corrected where there are mistakes. But they are surely more effective in

safeguarding borders, protecting against the risk of terrorism and combatting the merchants of death than any individual country acting on its own could possibly be.

This is the challenge that the whole of Europe faces today and, to conclude, it is perhaps the contest between, on the one hand, those who believe that Europe as it is today, although it may not be working well, needs to be improved not left, those who think that the euro as it is today needs to be better protected by a stronger central bank not abandoned and, on the other hand, those who think that the solution is to leave Europe and abandon the euro. It is a contest between those who still believe that Europe can be the solution and those, instead, who think that Europe is the problem.

The De Gasperi Foundation has invested culturally in the idea of Europe, thinking back to the name and the ideals of its founder father who aspired to make «more Europe». Alcide De Gasperi died with a pain in his heart at the thought that a European defence community had never been created, and heaven alone knows to what extent such a community would have served us today. If De Gasperi's ideal had become reality, we would have coordinated coexistent foreign and defence policies, the essential prerequisite for a proper European foreign policy. For this reason, President De Gasperi's solution, even then, was «more Europe», «more Europe for a better Europe».

All of this should remain within the logic of national States which must not lose their *ubi consistam* (their «place to stand firm»), they must not lose the very reason for their existence. This is precisely the point of balance that we in the European People's Party are striving to find. Who are our opponents in Europe? At this time not so much the Socialist group, with whom we govern in the European Union and in some European countries, as with those forces which point to Europe as the problem rather than the solution: I am referring to the so-called populist forces who, as a matter of fact, are all in opposition to the government of which Juncker is Presi-

dent and Federica Mogherini Vice President. And so this is our ideal, this is our project, this is our appraisal of the situation in Europe and the Mediterranean today.

One last thought on the Mediterranean. We still have the idea, inherited from Gian Battista Vico, that in history there are ebbs and flows. Well, once again, this theory is proving itself true with regard to the Mediterranean. Seen on the map, it resembles a lake with respect to the great oceans and, in fact, if compared to these oceans in form and dimensions, it is just a lake, a very small stretch of water. But that lake is once again a crucial location in the destiny of the world. There, on that big lake or little sea, as happened thousands and thousands of years ago, decisive events in the history of the world are again being played out. Our great fellow countryman Giorgio La Pira once said that the Mediterranean is like a continuation of the Lake of Tiberias. Well, in that lake we are ready once again to place our bet on a future of peace and prosperity for the nations of Europe, the peoples of Europe and the citizens of Europe.

Chapter II

*Mohammed Shaker
Chairman of the Council
for Foreign Policy of Egypt*

Excellences, ladies and gentlemen, it is really a pleasure to be here with you in one of the most friendly and nearest European country to Egypt to discuss a mutual issue that I believe requires concerted efforts of the entire Middle east region and Europe in order to reach a clear vision and practical solutions.

Migration is not just a legal or political question that the Italian government has to deal with every day, it is part of the greater question of development, cooperation and most importantly coexistence in our region. As you are all well aware, our region is facing a number of political and economic challenges that weighs heavily on its citizens which prompted a great number of people to look for solutions to their daily sufferings. Italy appeared as a destination and a refuge in their search for a dignified life sometimes missing in their home countries. However their attempts to provide a decent life for themselves and their families were often disappointing and humiliating and even life threatening.

I believe that we can still solve this problem or at least alleviate its impact on all parties if we work together in depth vision of the political and economic challenges facing our region, along with persistent efforts in order to reach the needed understanding and a solid commitment to our moral, political values, that we all share.

What a coincidence on the day I received your invitation to participate in this meeting I came across the *Time magazine* article on Lampedusa island by Charlotte McDonald Gibsen (*Time* of December 1st to 8th 2014). I took the liberty in making it available to those who haven't seen it yet. The title is *The depths of Europe shame. The EU's reluctance to help migrants crossing the Mediterranean betrays the organization's values*. Egypt is not immune from similar attempts to take refuge in different destinations apart from Italy with similar disastrous consequences. I thank the organizers for arranging this meeting. I hope to be useful and I will try to introduce remedies and solutions satisfactory to all parties, refugees, Italy and other potential hosting countries in Europe.

In anticipation of similar migration attempts by Egyptian citizens, lured by attractive work opportunities in Europe, the Egyptian government has tended to offer the Egyptian labour force opportunities to be well prepared to cope with jobs available in Europe, including Italy. For example during the recent visit last week to Rome of President of Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a number of cooperation agreements were signed between Italy and Egypt, including a partnership agreement for vocational and technical training which would benefit thousands of Egyptians in the years to come, which may allow them to settle in Italy with decent and sustainable jobs. This agreement culminates years of cooperation between Egypt and Italy to train Egyptian labour force in varieties of jobs available in Italy. This reminds me of the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Italy in the area of labour migrations signed in Rome on May 19th, 2010, which was preceded by a joint declaration by the Egyptian Minister of Manpower and Migration and Italian Minister of Labour and Social Policies for cooperation and migration for seasonal work issued on November 28th, 2005 by the two Labour Ministries.

Two further examples revealed the depths of this cooperation. The first is the arrangement with the Istituto salesiano don Bosco which is under the umbrella of the Italian embassy in Cairo, whereby the Italian partner takes care of the training

cost including travel arrangements to Italy for those who are lucky to benefit from such an opportunity, including also continuing their studies in Italian universities.

Learning the Italian language therefore is a high priority. A leading Egyptian charity organization, the Sawiris Foundation for social development of which I am chairman of the Board of Trustees is involved in providing financial support for training the students at the Istituto don Bosco in Cairo; it is one of our major project among a variety of programs aiming at creating jobs for young people.

The second example is the offer made by a major charity organization in Egypt, the benevolent Misr-El-Kheir Foundation, to train 30 students graduates of preparatory school to join the Istituto Enrico Fermi in Fuscaldo, Italy, specialized in technical studies such as electronic communication, energy, even tailoring and fashion.

Learning the Italian language is also a must, a requirement that should be made compulsory before the age of sixteen, which is more or less the age of graduation from preparatory education. Let me make available to you the ten year anniversary book of the Sawiris Foundation activities as well as a reference to scholarship program of the don Bosco in a separate publication. This indicates seriousness.

There is also a labour attaché attached to the Egyptian embassy in Rome to follow up on all this matters of finding jobs for Egyptians here in Italy. I believe that if other nations follow the example of Egypt in cooperation with the Italian government the problem would be better handled with benefits to Italy and our immediate neighbors in the Mediterranean basin and even in Europe at large. European countries must play their role. I agree with the very timely *Time* article that Europe should be involved in finding solutions of this problem which is a very serious one. I believe that Italy will keep on playing its role as a full fledged partner.

Chapter III

Giorgio Bertin
Bishop of Djibouti

First of all, thank you very much for this invitation, which reached me just a few days ago while I was in Nairobi for a series of meetings, about Somalia in particular. In fact, I am the Bishop of Djibouti and at the same time Apostolic Administrator for Somalia – to put it simply, even if not strictly speaking correctly, also the Bishop of Somalia.

By pure coincidence, while I was taking the plane from Nairobi back to Djibouti, I saw a group of twenty or thirty young people, all Ethiopians, who were refused entry and put on the plane, Ethiopians who had therefore illegally entered Kenya.

If we glance, even just for a moment, at the reasons for migration from the Horn of Africa we find, in the first place, the recent civil wars, without any need to go back too far in time. The situation in Somalia, for example, is well known: without a proper State since 1991 and plunged into confusion after a dictatorship lasting more than twenty years, it has therefore become a source and exit point of migrations. Since last December, the new State of south Sudan has also been a focal point of internal conflict and consequent migration for almost a year.

Civil war is therefore one of the reasons. Sometimes there are also oppressive regimes and here I am thinking of Eritrea, a country bordering on Djibouti but with the frontier closed

because of a dispute which happened six or seven years ago. I have read that there are thousands of refugees trying to get out of Eritrea and enter Ethiopia or to flee towards the North passing through Sudan and on to Libya or sometimes Egypt and the Sinai.

Other motives are political, ethnic, clan-related or religious. Here I am thinking, above all, of the situation in Ethiopia, where there is a federal government but also deep-rooted conflicts at an ethnic level. If we consider migrants coming from Ethiopia and crossing Djibouti to reach Yemen, we find that the majority of them are probably Oromo; indeed, there is an Oromo Liberation Front which opposes the present authorities in Ethiopia. However, alongside these Oromo, we also find groups coming from Tigray, a strange fact given that those in power at the moment are above all Tigrayans, at least so they say in Ethiopia.

In Somalia there are constant disputes between clans and there is also Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, it is easy to confuse all this with what is happening in Kenya. In the last two weeks the so-called Shabaab group is thought to have been behind some very serious massacres: passengers on a bus are reported to have been separated into Muslims, whose lives were spared, and those of other religions (among whom twenty-eight Christians) who were killed. I read yesterday that the same thing happened to a group of about thirty mineworkers, fifteen kilometres from Mandera. They were divided up, with some being saved and others condemned, almost as in the parable of the sheep and the goats in the gospel on the Sunday of Christ the King.

Thus there are also religious motives, and in this case I am referring especially to Somalia, but also to Ethiopia. When I say Somalia, I include also that part of Somalia, the former British protectorate, which is known as the Republic of Somaliland, although not recognized. If it were not for these differences, these would be fairly stable countries and yet, there too, in Somaliland, it is estimated that about 700 young people per month are leaving through Ethiopia, and then on to Sudan in the direction of Libya.

Returning to the Ethiopians, and especially the Tigrayans, I used to wonder: why do they keep crossing Djibouti or northern Somalia and heading for Yemen? In the end I found the answer: they are simply seeking a better life, the real motive behind migrations from these countries.

But now I would like to turn back to a sentence from our Minister Alfano which struck me. He said: we have eliminated the borders inside the European Union and now we must defend the external ones. I asked myself: how? And then an experience I had about eleven or twelve years ago came to my mind. You remember, of course, the attack to the Twin Towers in New York in September 2001. Well, a few months or a year later, I met two American servicemen who were carrying out an investigation in Djibouti. They wanted to meet different people and had also come to see me because of my experience in Somalia and Djibouti. They told me very clearly: «We are here to protect, to fight against terrorism» and they were thinking especially of terrorism originating in Somalia. We discussed things and at one point I said: «But I am also fighting against terrorism. You should give me one of your tanks. Then I'll sell it and with the money I'll carry on my fight against terrorism». They asked me: «But how are you fighting against terrorism?». I said: «Look, the difference is this. You are carrying out a military battle, and I believe there are situations in which the use of force is legitimate, so I'm not an extremist pacifist. Yes, you, with your force are necessary. However, consider this: you are involved in a direct fight, you attack the symptoms, but it is also necessary to deal with the underlying problem. So I say, with the money from selling one of your tanks, I can press ahead with my schools, the Catholic schools of Djibouti for at least...», with the money from selling a tank I thought of something like ten years. And I said to them «Do you see? We are fighting terrorism because we are bringing together people from different ethnic groups and seating them together on the same benches at school. In Djibouti there is the Somali ethnic group, the Afar group and a small ethnic group of Yemeni origin, not to men-

tion migrants from Ethiopia. All different ethnic groups and different clans because sometimes, especially in Somalia, the problem is really between clans. We also bring together different social groups: the rich, the less rich, the desperately poor. We bring together people and groups from different religions too and, through our system, we help them to live together and to accept their differences, see them not as a provocation but as a challenge to build a better and more peaceful world».

I remember that my American interlocutors were quite struck, even though in the end they didn't present me with a tank. And so my mission goes on, between Djibouti and Somalia.

To return to what Minister of the Interior Alfano said about defending our external borders: for a moment I would like to consider things from the point of view of my native country, Italy, and therefore Europe. I would say this: to defend the external borders certainly there is a need for policing and other forms of coercion. But probably also, and I am convinced of this, Europe has a role to play with its history of 2,000 years, with its culture, with its traditions, with its languages – fundamental channels of communication. Just think of the role of French and English in Africa, not to mention Portuguese and even Italian in Somalia. We have an enormous potential that we must share, gifts that are not only economic but also cultural, of respect, of democracy – the fact, for example, that democracy should not be confused with simple majority rule. I think that if we really want to defend Europe's borders, we must not remain enclosed inside Europe but must collaborate with other populations and export the best of ourselves.

Chapter IV

Hassan Abouyoub
Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco
to the Italian Republic

I would like to express my thanks to the President and to the De Gasperi Foundation and the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies for their invitation.

In this seminar I have been able to listen to presentations of a statistical nature, another more political in tone and then the speech by the person in Italy with institutional responsibility for dealing with these migrations, a drama which, to my sorrow, I witnessed in Lampedusa last year. We have also heard the voice of reason and spirituality.

However, among all these perspectives, as a Moroccan, I feel myself a little lost. My thoughts go back to 1994 when we began to consider ideas which would be made concrete in Barcelona a year later: discussion about immigration then was from a humanitarian point of view; talk was above all about how to generalise social rights or the social rights of foreign communities in Europe and never, never about imposing absolute limits on numbers. So, in a few years, the conversation has changed and the language too has changed, in the sense that we are now dealing with an issue of enormous political, psychological, social and cultural complexity.

With regard to the partnership between North and South in the Mediterranean, we have put back on the negotiating table

the definition of the frontier that existed in 1700. We have abandoned a much broader concept of borders and one which did not simply signify the limits which give rise to an identity. So, in a certain sense, we are turning back to what destroyed the *pax romana* in the Mediterranean by treating this complex of problems once again from the perspective of conflict or competition or internal political rivalry. For this reason it is obviously very difficult to express a view: it is necessary to carry out an act of intellectual autonomy from all these many prejudices.

A first prejudice is the idea that the most significant part of these migratory flows involves the North of the Mediterranean. Europeans think that the burden of immigration weighs predominantly on Europe. In fact, the heaviest burden is on the southern Mediterranean. Here are a few figures: Tunisia has received 1,200,000 Libyans out of a total population of seven million. This proportion for Italy would mean a total of fifteen million migrants. A country like Jordan now has a population composed of 35%-40% refugees. Again, in relation to Italy, this proportion would mean twenty-five to thirty million refugees. This weight, this burden, is not a projection by the press in these countries but a serious problem of how to deal with these political refugees and integrate them into society.

In 1950 the population in Africa of working age was more or less one hundred and twenty million. In 2050 the African working age population will be one billion two hundred million. We still have no real answer to such a challenge, either in the current migratory policy in Europe or among ourselves at the regional level. What all of this means is that, so far, we have not treated the great issue of human capital and its mobility in a globalized world in a just and appropriate manner.

Therefore we need to reinvent even the words to talk about the issue if we are to formulate collectively a policy to manage mobility. I do not use the word immigration because it is a little difficult to use from an ethical point of view. In the past we spoke of pilgrims and nomads, never immigrants, because all of us in the world are, in a certain sense, children of immigrants.

Personally, I come from a country which has always had the mentality of being both a recipient and also an emitter of migrants. We invaded Spain and stayed there for 800 years. What should we call this? Immigration? Invasion? At the end of the First World War we received about 200,000 Europeans, among them 50,000 Italians, never thought of or treated as immigrants. Right up to today the Italian families in Casablanca, or those Sicilians who invented the Moroccan liberty style, have given their names to buildings and have never disturbed our sense of identity and openness.

So we need to rethink immigration, in the awareness that, because of its demographic decline, Europe will not grow any more. We have seen statistics that clarify this fact very clearly. We know perfectly well that Europe is no longer capable of generating economic growth sufficient to finance the model of welfare invented after the Second World War. This is a failure and we economists know it well.

Immigration is not the solution, either economically or fiscally, for this awesome challenge, but it does represent a component in a possible new framework – and I say this as an economist – in which the Mediterranean is not the little lake that my very dear friend Minister Alfano talked about, but rather the centre of a great human zone of global demography stretching roughly from the Aral Sea to the Gulf of Guinea. This is the great human challenge that we need to take on.

In Morocco we are facing the challenge through an emerging new scenario. For the first time for three or four years we are seeing an inversion of migratory flows at the national level: in other words the number of Moroccans leaving the country is much lower than in the past and much more limited than the flows that we are receiving from further South in Africa but also from the North: Spain, Italy, France etc. We have therefore completely transformed our structures and even the thinking behind them. In the first place, we decided to initiate a process of dialogue with neighbouring countries. This is how the

Rabat Process, already mentioned by Angelino Alfano, began. It signifies the rejection of a solution limited only to security in favour of a holistic approach capable of drawing together and putting into effect all the various components of a global policy including economics, culture, knowledge, education etc. and obviously security, also a necessary element.

At the same time, in the field of security, we have begun our own national response. To give some figures, the budget voted by the Moroccan Parliament devotes almost two hundred million euros every year to funding the protection of the national territory in the face of immigration: this translates into a force of fifteen thousand people mobilised 24 hours a day, seven days a week. This expense is much greater than the total European aid provided by EUROMED: it is 150% of what Morocco usually receives from European funds in the Barcelona system or from the Union for the Mediterranean. Just to give some idea, we spend much more than Italy has spent on the Mare Nostrum operation. Incidentally, this was a fine initiative and, once again, I would like to take this opportunity to commend Italy for the humanitarian way in which it handled that dramatic situation.

Lampedusa-Europe, therefore signifies for me, above all, the ability of Europe to abandon the arrogance with which it has treated the South of the Mediterranean and to accept the fact that we are now all in the same boat. In this boat the subject of immigration, unfortunately, is only one of fifty other global issues which the Westphalian nation-state is no longer capable of resolving on its own and which require governance at a multilateral or regional level, similar to the way in which the EU manages agriculture through the CAP.

It seems to me that, with regard to the aim of remedying the by now obvious failure of European policy in the Mediterranean, immigration is perhaps the least suitable indicator for measuring the relevance of common choices and shared policies. It would be better to look, for example, at the education system, accepting the fact that in Morocco, Algeria and

Tunisia we are now educating young people for the European market; this is already the reality. But we are also taking in brains from Europe who are now working with us. Thus we must rethink, in a collective way, the system of interconnections between school, university and the labour market.

We must work together to completely rethink agriculture in the Mediterranean since there is a climate and environmental challenge, I would even say a challenge to sustainability at the ecological level because there is no more water, either to the North or to the South of the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, with regard to water scarcity, Spain is falling behind certain countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

We also need to rethink the whole subject of logistics and urban infrastructure because unfortunately (and this is a fact) by 2050 85% of the southern shore of the Mediterranean will have an urban population. Thus far it is not clear how it will be possible to face up to the enormous needs that this new situation will generate, with demands which will require the mobilisation of resources at a level that can only be described as crazy, if you will excuse the expression.

We have to consider that – with the loss of jobs in Europe following the crisis and with our demographic inheritance of the last twenty years – we have the task of creating almost sixty million jobs over the next twenty to twenty-five years. Put that figure next to the one billion two hundred million working age population and it is easy to see that our old method of dialogue, working together to create a space of shared prosperity as described in Barcelona, has no chance of producing concrete results without the necessary shared and collective humility and without a leadership which is unfortunately absent in the Mediterranean, both in Europe and in the South.

The alternative would be for Italy to play the role of protagonist – her historical-geographical vocation is so obvious that it hardly needs to be mentioned – and I would add that it could do this together with my country which, along with Turkey, remains a haven of peace in the South.

I think that we all have a duty to work together to create a different environment from that which, unfortunately, we currently see both in the South and the North, to take up again the Mediterranean project and relaunch it. I know that in the South of Italy there are initiatives encouraged by the Prime Minister which are daring to confront this challenge through a bottom up approach, from the people, from the base, to the top, forgetting about the bureaucracy in Brussels and national bureaucracies. Thus it is possible to reinvent a project, which would be global, to give expression to what for me, having worked for thirty-five years on the subject, is the true future opportunity of the Mediterranean, and that is its human capital.

Chapter v

Laurens Jolles
Regional Representative for Southern Europe,
UNHCR

I would like to make a short premise in order to react to some of the observations that were made here before.

I really appreciated the emphasis of the speaker of the previous panel on mobility and protection. I think these issues are extremely important and too little has been said about them. I mean those two concepts were not sufficiently developed as they should have been, because they are extremely, extremely important. Integration is the biggest challenge, I agree, totally agree, probably the biggest challenge that we have here in Europe and very little was said about that also.

The fact that mutual trust does not exist is indeed true. This is at the basis of the inability, so far, of the member states to agree on how the common European system should be functioning.

I want to say something also about some of the other things I've heard regarding cooperation with third countries and the emphasis on closing the routes of traffickers, ensuring that these criminal routes could no longer be used. The word protection was used a lot in that perspective, protecting our borders, but I heard hardly anything about protection of refugees. Perhaps it is a professional deformation, but I come from UNHCR so for me protection of refugees or asylum should be the basis of any

discussion around these questions in a European context, in order to ensure that goal rather than putting emphasis on the external borders.

Then there was something said about creating refugee camps there, mainly with reference to some countries of north Africa, refugee camps where the European countries could go and assess the needs of people and then ensure that they could come to Europe. That might even be a solution, however we have to be realistic: in order to do that we would need a huge commitment on the part of all European countries or many of them, to ensure that a great number of people can be resettled in their countries. We are not talking then about 2,000 here, 500 there; we are possibly talking about hundreds of thousands and that commitment has not been there and has not proven to be there up to this moment.

I think that speaking about protection and being able to look at protection in a European context is really a sign of advanced culture in a great civilization and probably its ultimate challenge.

I will now switch to Italian for the prepared part of my speech.

(The following part of the text has been translated from Italian)

When I received the invitation and read about the subject of the conference, *Lampedusa-Europe: a common way*, my thoughts went back to when I accompanied the High Commissioner on a visit to Lampedusa on the occasion of World Refugee Day in June 2011. Among all the places in the world significant for refugees, UNHCR chose specifically to go to Lampedusa to celebrate World Refugee Day because in recent years that wonderful island, as has already been mentioned, has truly become an international symbol, a symbol of welcome and great humanitarian spirit, of doors open to others; but unfortunately it is also a tragic symbol of death because of those who have lost their lives, as some speakers

have previously recalled, in trying to reach Europe across the Mediterranean.

Over the last few years we have witnessed the transformation of the whole Italian coast into so many Lampedusa: the Mediterranean has become our new humanitarian border. From January to October 2014 about 196,000 people arrived by sea along the coasts of Europe, 150,000 in Italy alone. The increase in landings had already begun in the months of June and July last year, before the Mare Nostrum operation was set up, and continued throughout 2014. Such a high number of arrivals is the direct consequence of one of the periods most disturbed by conflicts of the last sixty years.

For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the number of refugees, asylum seekers and internal displaced people around the world has exceeded fifty million. Fifty million is a lot of people! Never before have so many men, women and children been forced to flee because of violence and persecution. This massive increase is mainly due to the war in Syria, which has already forced over three million people to become refugees and another six and a half million to evacuate their homes. I was very pleased to hear what the Moroccan ambassador said when he reminded us that the number of refugees in the countries of north Africa and the Middle East is extremely high; we are talking about millions. Compared to that number, perhaps 80% of the refugees in the world, the number of people arriving in Italy or in Europe is very low, and is absolutely manageable.

After the tragic events on October 3rd and 11th 2013, in which over 600 people died in two separate incidents, there were many words of indignation and commiseration from Italian and European institutions but it is only right to say – and fortunately it has been said several times, including today – that Italy distinguished itself on that occasion by following up on its words with deeds, putting into effect the Mare Nostrum operation. I particularly want to mention this because I am a great supporter of what happened and of the fact that there

could be an operation like Mare Nostrum last year. It was a courageous, farsighted initiative, a proper response to the circumstances showing great humanity and an example of generosity and commitment on the part of Italy. Although it is understandable that the Italian government should express satisfaction, as it has done recently, at its success in involving numerous European countries in the Triton operation, for me it is important to underline that this European commitment is aimed above all at safeguarding part of the external maritime frontier and not at operations of rescue at sea, as was the case with Mare Nostrum.

Consequently, although it represents an important step towards greater participation at a European level, this operation does nothing to diminish the great concern of the UNHCR, and also many other institutions and organizations, over the gradual suspension of the Mare Nostrum operation without Europe having reached an agreement to guarantee that there will continue to be patrolling in the Mediterranean with the aim of sea rescue and that there will be sufficient means for rescue operations. Without such an agreement, and with the limited means and mandate of the Triton operation, there is the risk that other terrible shipwrecks will happen in the future.

The handling of this migratory flow naturally represents a challenge for the whole of Europe, for the European Union. The situation in the Mediterranean Sea is complicated and requires a series of interventions, over the short and long term, in countries of origin, in countries of transit and in countries of destination. The UNHCR has set up an annual consultation called the High Commissioner's Dialogue which will take place in Geneva in the coming weeks. The subject will be specifically protection at sea, in the hope that this will further enrich the content of the UNHCR's global initiative and provide important inspiration.

Italy is called upon to make a major contribution at the European level to the many issues which we are discussing, not only because of its strategical geographical position but

also because of its current presidency of the European Union. It can contribute in a significant way to the debate – as it is doing – on questions which require common action by all countries of the European Union and which I will only outline here because of limits of time.

There has been discussion about concepts that it would take too long to describe here in detail. Mutual recognition, for example, means that once a person is recognized in one country, he or she can also go to another country. The concept is linked, therefore, to that of internal mobility in Europe, movement not only to Europe but also within Europe, which one of the previous speakers talked about.

The Dublin Regulation: much has been said about the Dublin Regulation, and much remains to be said, but the important thing is that it should not be used only in a limited way in an attempt to restrict access to certain countries and send migrants back to the countries where they first arrived. An intrinsic element of the Dublin Regulation is that it is also possible to identify where it is best to send the refugee or asylum seeker for humanitarian reasons, for reasons of extended family relations or also for other links that there may be. Unfortunately, these possibilities are not being exploited, or only to a very small extent, including by Italy I have to say. This is a perspective which should be considered in a much more strategic way, with greater ability to see how internal mobility can be facilitated also through the rules, including the Dublin Rule, which are already on the table and which will be difficult to change in the immediate future.

There is also discussion about greater cooperation with the States of north Africa, including with regard to protection and the strengthening of their institutional capacity. This could constitute the basis for a more comprehensive regional approach to the handling of migration and the protection of refugees in the Mediterranean in the interests of both the European Union and its neighbours.

On this point, mention has already been made of the idea that the evaluation of asylum requests could take place in third-

party countries in north Africa, including Libya. It seems only right to stress that, given the present situation in Libya, it would not be responsible to even suggest creating centres there to evaluate asylum demands in order to gain access to Europe. It should also be borne in mind how risky it is for refugees to reach the countries of north Africa, a journey just as dangerous as the sea crossing. I think it is helpful to underline these concerns because any idea about setting up centres to process asylum demands in a third-party country, leaving aside the identification of the authorities who would be responsible for it, cannot get off the ground without adequate conditions of security and without a commitment by Europe to look genuinely into the question of how they can get people to Europe, also from other countries of transit. We understand, however, that the objective is to avoid people having to undertake such dangerous journeys, taking place under terrible conditions on makeshift boats operated by unscrupulous traffickers.

UNHCR has therefore urged member states of the European Union to increase their efforts to prevent, as far as possible, these highly dangerous sea crossings as well as the trafficking of human beings, but also to provide refugees with legal alternatives, as has already been mentioned. This is an objective as difficult to accomplish as it is easy to talk about; but we need to regard it as a great commitment.

I will list some of the ways in which legal alternatives can be guaranteed to refugees: resettlement (but, as we will see, done in a credible way and on a large rather than small scale), relocation based on humanitarian needs and facilitated access to family reunion.

Among the measures proposed by UNHCR – I would like to consider for a moment the principal tool in other words resettlement. By this means an individual State declares itself ready to receive a certain number of refugees who live in third-party countries where there is a risk to their lives, their health and respect for their rights. In its global report the UNHCR estimated that in 2013 over 800,000 people around the world found

themselves in need of being resettled. However, by contrast, the number of people actually resettled in twenty-seven countries which were willing to receive them, still in 2013, came to 71,000. I repeat what I said before: for a resettlement programme to have any real added value it is essential, in the first place, that States offer significant quotas much bigger than those normally offered so far.

The difficulty could be seen in the case of Malta, a rather small island which found itself having to handle a large number of refugees. Around Europe it was said that Malta would be helped. However the availability offered by States was extremely limited: there was talk of two, fifteen, twenty, perhaps twenty-five people, truly derisive numbers.

I would like to conclude by reaffirming that the time has come for European Union institutions and member states to intensify their collective actions to reinforce rescue operations, above all, to provide rapid access to asylum and to try to increase legal alternatives for those seeking asylum in Europe. The management of migratory flows by sea represents, naturally, a challenge for the European Union, a challenge which can and must be successfully met without having to lower standards of quality and also without forgetting that the essential thing is to focus on protection. It is vital to remember at all times that the protection of refugees and the protection of asylum seekers – in other words people who do not choose but are forced to flee from their countries because there is persecution, there is war, there is total insecurity – is something which absolutely must become the cornerstone for the management of migration.

Chapter VI

Mikuláš Dzurinda
President of the Wilfried Martens Centre
for European Studies

Migration is one of the biggest challenges which we are facing in these days. Nowhere in Europe the effects of migration are felt as in the South, including here in Italy. As a relatively rich continent, we should be able to meet the migration challenge; we certainly have the necessary resources. What we do not seem to have enough, in my mind, is the political will and the willingness to cooperate with one another.

The unnecessary deaths in the Mediterranean constitute an emergency and the whole phenomenon needs to be addressed at the European level. It means that we Europeans need to talk to one another about these humanitarian disasters and we need to take action. The Lampedusa tragedy in October 2013 highlighted that the European migration system is malfunctioning. As the former Home Affairs commissioner Cecilia Malström put it: it is virtually impossible to come to Europe in a legal and safe way. We do not have enough solidarity between the EU member states when it comes to guarding the external borders of the EU, fighting criminals, operating on the EU borders, preventing deaths, accepting refugees and granting asylum.

We have in effect 28 different immigration systems and so far efforts to create EU policies have fallen short. On the EU borders the Frontex Agency is tasked with assisting the mem-

ber states with border control, but it seems that the system is not working. It does not do enough to prevent criminality and smuggling of people, it does not solve the problem of poor reception conditions in some member states and it doesn't solve the problem of distributing the share of looking after refugees that have reached the shores of Europe.

A step forward has been made with the Frontex Joint Triton Operation which replaced (as Minister Alfano stated a minute ago) on 1st November 2014 the military and humanitarian operation known as Mare Nostrum. Italy has the great merit of having made a huge effort with Mare Nostrum, helping to deal with the emergency and to save hundreds of thousands of lives.

And the new Triton Operation is a political success of Europe in terms of cooperation and support among member states. For the first time irregular immigration was acknowledged as a European issue, which needs to be addressed at the European level. I know how much effort Minister Angelino Alfano put in negotiations and how many difficulties Italy is still facing. However, although cooperation should keep improving, I think now we are moving in the right direction. When it comes to providing refuge for thousands of refugees, several EU countries are taking a lot of responsibility. These countries lead by example, others accept only several dozens of asylum seekers each year. Again, cooperation and solidarity are important.

I must unfortunately remark that my country – Slovakia – accepts only a couple of dozens of asylum seekers each year. Other countries in the centre of Europe – the countries of Visegrad Four, it means Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – have adopted similar policies: this can no longer be sustained in the face of wars conflicts and famine in the relative vicinity of Europe.

Tackling the migration flows issue we should not forget the other side of the coin: immigration can be a resource, but we need to set a common strategy to address it. An example of the value brought by immigrants to our economies and soci-

eties: a recent study on the fiscal effects of immigration to the United Kingdom, published this year by Dustman and Frattini shows that between 2001 and 2011 non-European immigrants have given a positive net fiscal contribution to a total of over 5 billion British pounds, which means 6.3 billion euros. And I'm sure that all over Europe we can find evidence of the benefits that we've got so far from migrations.

It is also true that our Schengen system is under strain, especially with respect to irregular immigration. I understand why some countries are voicing reservations about our travel free area: when the Schengen border is not properly policed, this allows desperate refugees to cross the continent and travel as far Calais or the northern coast of France. There they can wait for weeks and months in miserable living conditions trying to cross the English Channel by jumping into lorries that travel to England. That's a problem that is unresolved: at the Europe's southern border gets transported to other parts of the Schengen soil.

So, I mean that the substantial or the crucial question is: what are the solutions? I fully agree with monsignor Bertin stating or meaning that the best investment is that into prevention. We should help people in the areas of these tragedies, in the poorest areas; there is something in Europe that is called Official Development Aid: I visited several countries within the last few years (I was not only in Kenya but also in south Sudan, in Ethiopia) and I met many people, I met people not only from Catholic Church, but also from many NGOs, happy people in these challenging countries. So, there is no doubt that our mission should continue in this regard and we should be able to invest more in prevention. But also – as I said – cooperation and solidarity are the core values of a joined action. Some important decisions have been made in this direction but we need to do more. In Europe we must try to keep the continent open to those who need protection. This includes those who are escaping from war or dictatorship, where the EU has a humanitarian responsibility.

In order to achieve this we need to do several things, I will mention briefly these things in eight points.

1. We must tackle the criminal networks that exploit on people's misery and smuggle people into Europe. In this regard the EU member states, enforcement agencies and the External Action Service need to cooperate with countries of origin.
2. We should strengthen the Frontex Agency that helps to guard the EU's external border.
3. We must welcome that the EU's Common European Asylum System has been recently adopted. This is a major step forward and member states now must implement the necessary laws to guarantee the human asylum procedure across the EU.
4. We must also make progress with our discussions on how to distribute asylum seekers and refugees across the EU. It can not be right that the southern members are left alone.
5. The EU members need to strengthen the political cooperation on refugees and asylum in particular and on immigration in general. In this regard I welcome that the European Commission is undertaking to adopt a more political role in Justice and Home Affairs matters, where the Vice President on the Rule of Law Frans Timmermans will guide, coordinate and supervise the relevant Directors of the Commission, it means Directorate-General Justice and Directorate-General Home Affairs.
6. Member states need to increase their law enforcement capacities and capabilities to tackle abuses. Too many people are allowed to their stay in Europe, despite the fact that their visas have expired or their asylum applications were rejected. This cannot be right for either the rule of law or our health and education systems.
7. We need political leadership. At the EU and national levels we should adopt better immigration strategies and explain these decisions to our people, to our electorate. Again, I

must welcome the commitment of the European Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker to review the Blue Card scheme for legal immigration and to improve the functioning of the legal immigration into the EU in general. I'm certain that if we allow people to come into EU legally, we will reduce illegal immigration. I hope that the new Commission marks the beginning of an end of the era of – allow me to say – sclerotic ambivalence in the EU approach to immigration.

8. Finally, we need much better cooperation with our neighbors to the South and the East. More work needs to be done on re-admission agreements with our neighbors, on visas, on economic conditions in the countries of origin, on tackling criminals. In this respect I'm glad that the representatives of countries in north Africa are with us today. There is a lot we can do.

But first of all – as mentioned before – we need the political will and the willingness to cooperate. We do have to take action in order to stop tragedies in the Mediterranean sea, as Pope Francis reminded us in his recent speech to the European Parliament. We do have to tackle the immigration issue seriously, in order to stop the rise of populist movements which play on the fears of people and encourage intolerance and racism in European societies. We do have to consider migration flows, as I said before, as an opportunity for our societies, for our economies and not only as a problem that we have to cope with. I'm confident that such debates can contribute in a rising awareness among people and push the cooperation and step forward. For this reason it has been a pleasure to cooperate with the De Gasperi Foundation on this initiative and I hope I will have further opportunities to enhance our collaboration. Thank you very much for your attention.

